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Infant-Industry Protection Reconsidered:
The Case of Informational Barriers to Entry
ABSTRACT
In industries with imperfect consumer information, the lack of a
reputation puts latecomers at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis established
firms. We consider whether the existence of such informational barriers to
entry provides a valid reason for temporarily protecting infant producers of
experience goods and services. Our model incorporates both moral hazard in an
individual firm's choice of quality and adverse selection among potential
entrants into the industry. We find that infant-industry protection often











The skepticism and occasional critiques of certain international economists
notwithstanding, the infant-industry argument remains a well-respected legitimi-
zation of temporary protection for emerging sectors in developing countries, and
even elsewhere. The argument presumes the existence of barriers to entry, which
inhibit or prevent the growth of a new local industry in circumstances where the
home country would seem to enjoy long-run comparative cost advantage in perform-
ing a particular activity. If the failure of the industry to come into existence
or to expand to a degree consistent with underlying cost conditions can be traced
to an external effect among producers, and if the prior emergence of a competing
foreign sector, contributes to the inability of the local industry to establish
itself, then it would seem that temporary, entry-promoting protection is justi-
fied on social welfare grounds.
Traditionally, proponents of the infant-industry argument have pointed to
dynamic scale economies stemming from learning-curve effects and from the need
for development of a base of applicable skills among the sectoral labor force as
the relevant barriers to entry into industrial activities.' More recently,
industrial organization theorists have noted (making reference, however, to the
seminal work of Bain (1956)) that imperfect information can serve as a barrier to
entry when consumers cannot readily observe all of the attributes of a good prior
to purchase, and when they must, therefore, rely on reputation as an indication
of product quality. Schmalensee (1982), Farrell (1986), and Bagwell (1985) have
developed models in which early entrants enjoy a competitive advantage relative
to latecomers merely as a consequence of their having entered sooner.In. these
models, the industry mavericks already have developed their reputations among
'See, for example, Clemhout and Wan (1970) and the critical discussion in
Corden (1974, chapter 9).-2-
consumers when later potential competitors contemplate entry.'MetootT brands
offering similar quality products at similar or even lower costs to those of
established brands often are not able to penetrate the market, in cases where the
initial entrants, facing no corresponding competition, were able to do so.
The argument that informational barriers might preclude efficient entry
would seem to have relevance for certain progressive industries in the modern,
manufacturing sector. Many innovative products are technically sophisticated, so
that some consumers may be ill-equipped to assess their attributes. Some less
developed countries may have comparative advantage in producing various of these
goods based on relative factor-cost comparisons. But the LDC producers may find
it difficult to enter the (local or international) market in competition with the
initial, foreign developers of the products, whose names and reputations are
likely to be well-known to consumers by the time that domestic entry is
technologically feasible.
The argument may have even more force when applied to international trade in
services. Recently, there has been much discussion of appropriate trade policy
for services, and many commentators have noted the seeming reluctance of the less
developed countries to enter into negotiations aimed at liberalizing trade in
this sector.2 An infant-industry argument based on learning-by-doing and
decreasing costs over time may not apply to many of the service industries (see
Hindlay and Smith (1984)). But consider a characteristic shared by most
services, namely that production is customized to the requirements of each
particular consumer. Once a service has been produced for a specific customer,
the provider is unlikely to be able to remarket that same service to an
alternative buyer in the event that the initial one is dissatisfied. This means
2For a discussion of the LDC position on liberalization of services trade,
see Bhagwati (1986).-3-
that the consumer and the supplier must enter into a purchase contract before the
service actually has been performed, and therefore at a time when the buyer will
not be in a position to inspect the quality of the final output. It follows that
reputations will be especially important in the markets for services. Absent
protection, potential local entrants into service industries may find it diffi-
cult or impossible to compete with well-established international concerns.
The above discussion raises the important question of whether the existence
of informational barriers to entry provides a valid reason for temporarily
protecting infant producers of experience goods and services in countries that
are followers rather than leaders in innovative industries.3 In what follows we
argue, perhaps surprisingly in light of the evident market failure described by
Schmalensee, Farrell, and Bagwell, that the answer is "no". We base our argument
on a fully specified model of endogenous entry, quality choice, and information
transmission. Our model combines elements of those of Farrell (1986) and Bagwell
(1985), incorporating both moral hazard in a firm's choice of quality and adverse
selection among potential entrants into the industry. We pay special attention
to the process of expectations formation, in keeping with the recent literature
on the role of reputations in markets with incomplete consumer information.
Our conclusions contrast sharply with those from a similarly focused study
by Mayer (1984). Mayer argued that export subsidization is warranted when actual
consumption experiences are required for (foreign) consumers to learn about
(domestic) products' qualities. The difference in findings can be attributed to
the fact that Mayer posited an ad hoc "product familiarization" process whereby
demand for home goods varies positively with cumulative past consumption; whereas
we incorporate expectations formation and consumer learning about the brands that
3Nelson (1970) introduced the term "experience goods" to denote products
whose qualities can be fully judged only after they have been consumed.-4-
they have experienced explicitly into our analysis. Our message is reminiscent
of that of Baldwin (1969), who took a closer look at the microfoundations of
dynamic scale economies and found that infant-industry protection often could not
correct the market distortions that the proponents of such policy described.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we specify a two-period
model of an infant domestic industry facing competition from an established
foreign sector. In this section, all potential domestic firms face a similar
capacity constraint, and it is not profitable for the more efficient among them
to signal (via price) their higher quality. We study the efficacy of both
temporary (first-period) and permanent protection under alternative assumptions
about consumers' expectations. In Section III, we allow for the possibility of
signalling via first-period output choice. We reconsider the welfare effects of
a temporary or permanent import tariff in the context of a separating
equilibrium. Our findings are summarized in a brief, concluding section.
II. INTANT-INDUSTRY PROTECTION WHENSIGNALLINGVIA OUTPUTS IS NOT POSSIBLE
A. A Model4
Initially, a well-established foreign sector supplies the domestic market
for an experience good or service. The attributes of the products sold by the
various foreign companies are known to domestic consumers from their past
consumption experience. The representative individual among a continuum of
domestic consumers demands exactly one unit of the good or service in each
period, with total demand equal to N. Perfect competition among the foreign
firms drives the surplus offered by each to a common level, U'-t.., where t.
is the specific tariff applicable to imports in period j.
4Our model draws on the work of Farrell (1986), who considers competition
between a single (strategic) incumbent and a single potential entrant.-5-
At the outset of period 1, a set of potential domestic producers indexed by
0 has acquired the technology needed to enter the industry. At this time, if a
firm of type 0 decides to enter, it chooses once-and-for-all its level of
quality, q(O), which, however, is not immediately observable by domestic
consumers. Firms are limited to qualities equal to or exceeding some q0;
consumers are assumed to be able to distinguish products of less than this
minimum, threshold level. A consumer who purchases the product of any domestic
firm in period 1 will learn that firm's quality before the start of the second
and final period. Thus, period 1 represents the infancy of the home industry,
when foreign products are known but local products are not, whereas period 2 is
the phase of mature competition, with domestic firms already having established
reputations among their clientele.
We assume that each domestic firm can produce at most one unit of output in
each period.5 A firm of type 0 choosing quality q has a per-period variable
production cost of Oc(q). The cumulative distribution of 0's among the set of
potential entrants is denoted by F(0), with marginal density function f(0)
and f(-) >0on support [0 ., 0 ].Withthis specification, each firm
mm max
faces moral hazard in its choice of quality, while the heterogeneity across firms
in the cost of providing quality introduces adverse selection into the industry
equilibrium.
Consumers value quality at rate y. A consumer having purchased domestic
brand 0 in period 1 and thereby learned its quality can enjoy second-period
surplus yq(0) -z(0)if he buys from the same firm again, where z(0) is that
5mis assumption is made mostly for expositional convenience. We shall
comment below on its significance, contrasting our results with those that would
obtain if each firm had upward sloping marginal costs, but outputs were not
observable by consumers. If outputs could vary and were observable by consumers,
then firms might use quantity as a signal of quality, as we discuss in Section
III.-6-
firm's second-period price. Thus, a firm of type 0 canmaintain its customer
basein the second period by setting z(O) =yq(0)
-U'+t2.We assume for
simplicity that any firm that chooses to produce minimum quality cannot
profitably remain active once product qualities are known.6 We will refer to
such firms as "fly—by-night," while firms that produce above minimum quality are
termed"reputable."
In the first period, no domestic firm will find it profitable to signal its
intention to produce high-quality merchandise. All active firms will have a
commonoutput level, namely one unit. So the only variable potentially available
as a signal is price. But higher prices cannot signal quality, since all firms
would then raise their prices; and there can be no benefit to a reputable firm
from choosing a low price to signal quality, since the only time that such an
investment could possibly be recouped is in the second period, and then
information is in any event complete. It follows that all domestic firms will
charge the same price, p, in the first-period equilibrium, and consumers will be
willing to buy local goods only if expected surplus equals or exceeds U -t1.
Consider now the decision problem facing a firm of type 0. This firm must
decide whether to enter the industry, and if so, what quality to produce and what
price to charge in the first period. Let us take the first-period price as given
for the moment. Then first-period profits from entering at quality q are n1(0)
=p-Oc(q).In the second period, if the firm has been reputable, it earns
n2(O)=max{O, yq -U"+t2-Oc(q)};otherwise, it earns zero. We assume that
the firmweightssecond-period profits by 6 when comparing these to first-period
profits. Note that 6 can exceed one, even with positive discounting, if the
6None of our results depends inany way on the exit of producers of
minimum-quality products from the market.—7—
"second" period actually represents a series of identical periods that occur
after reputations have been formed.
A reputable firm must earn positive profits in the second period, or else it
would have no incentive to choose q > q0. The optimal quality for a firm of type
0, if it chooses to be reputable, is found by maximizing jt(0) =n1(0)+ o2(o).
The first-order condition implies
ôy =(1+ ô)Oc'(q) , (1)
yielding discounted profits
=p+ ô(yq(0) -U"+ t2) -(1+ ô)Oc(q(0)) , (2)
where q(0) solves equation (1). Alternatively, the firm can choose a
F fly-by-night strategy, in which case it earns profits t (0)p -Oc(q0).
We plot and in Figure 1. Note that both are monotonically decreasing
functions of 0 and that d[(7tR(0)_lrF'(O)]/dO =c(q0)
-(1+ó)c(q(0))< 0. That is,
the incentive to establish a reputation declines with 0. This reflects the fact
that the marginal cost of supplying greater quality is lowest when 0 is small.
For a range of the most efficient potential entrants, the optimal strategy
generally involves choosing q =q(O)> q0. For some 0, the profits from being
reputable are equal to those from being fly-by-night. If, at this value of 0,
R(0) > 0 (as drawn), then the type of the marginal reputable firm, 0R, is given
•.• RRFR
implicitly by t (0 )= it(0 ),or








where qR =q(8R) In this case, potential entrants with intermediate values of
o in the range (0R, 0F1also will enter the market as fly-by-nights. The
F marginal firm in the market earns zero profits, so 0 =p/c(q0).
Alternatively, if profits are negative at the point where the two curves




and there are no fly-by-night firms active in the market (i.e., 0F =0R)
Finally, equilibrium first-period prices must be determined. These will
depend on how consumers form their beliefs about the quality of domestic output.
We entertain two alternative assumptions about expectations. First, we specify
that (equilibrium) expectations are rational, as in Farrell (1986), and that
out-of—equilibrium beliefs satisfy a "reasonableness" constraint. We also
investigate the implications for infant-industry protection of exogenous expecta-
tions on the part of domestic consumers, as in Schinalansee (1982).
With rational expectations, consumers calculate the average quality of
domestic products available on the market, and expect to receive this quality on
average when they buy from a local firm. Let qe be the expected average quality
of a domestic product and q be the actual average quality. Then rational
expectations imply qe =qand
__I R R1 1




71nthe earlier literature on equilibrium in markets with imperfect consumer
information, Shapiro (1983) assumed that consumers suspected the worst about new
entrants, while Allen (1984) allowed the consumers sufficient information to-9-
Consumers willingly purchase domestic products in the first period whenever
p < yq -U+ t1.Indeed, if this weak inequality holds as a strict inequality,
then all consumers will prefer domestic goods. Such a situation could be consis-
tent with a rational expectations equilibrium, if consumers were to hold
sufficiently pessimistic beliefs about what would be the quality offered by a
firm charging more than the going price. Then, no domestic firm would be able to
raise its price in response to excess demand. However, we would argue that many
of these beliefs about out-of-equilibrium behavior are not "reasonable." A
consumer seeing a deviant price, d might reasonably be agnostic about which of
the firms that could make a profit at has actually produced the good in
question. But consumers should rule out the possibility that the product offered
at price originates from a firm that would make losses charging that price and
choosing its optimal quality. If consumers calculate expected quality out of
equilibrium using a formula similar to (4), but with there replaced by the
d . indexof the marginal entrant at price p ,thenany firm experiencing excess
demand at a candidate equilibrium price can always deviate by raising its price
slightly and still make sales. The unique sequential equilibrium satisfying our
restriction on out-of-equilibrium beliefs has
pyq-U+t1 . (5a)
Consumers may lack the information on the cost function, c(), and on the
distribution of 0's in the population of potential entrants necessary to calcu-
late the average quality consistent with equilibrium. In such an event, a rule
calculate the incentives for the provision of quality consistent with the
equilibrium.—10-
ofthumb might be used instead. We are interested in the extent to whichour
conclusions about infant-industry protection rest on the strong informational
requirements of a rational expectations equilibrium. So we will investigate as
well a simple alternative: consumers initially hold some arbitrary (andperhaps
skeptical) belief about the average quality of a local good or service, qe =q
With these beliefs and firms pricing to maximize profits, the equilibrium
first—period price clears the market8, i.e.,
py-U +t1
. (5b)
This completes the description of the equilibrium. We turn now to the
welfare analysis of temporary protection.
B. Temporary Protection
The infant industry argument typically endorses temporary protection until
such a time as the domestic industry achieves equal footing with its foreign
rivals. In our model, this corresponds to a policy witht1 >0and t2 0.
We take domestic welfare, W, to be the sum of consumer surplus, CS, produc-
er surplus, PS, and government revenue, GR. These are given by






0F PS =5[p+ôz(O)-(1+ô)Oc(q(O))]dF(O)÷ 5[p-
Oc(q0)}dF(0) 0. R mm 0
81f expectationsare "too pessimistic," entry by even the most efficient
firm at the price dictated by equation (5b) would be precluded. Such would
always be the case under our assumptions, for example, if q =q0.—11—
GR =t1[N
-F(O')]+ôt2[N
-F(OR)] .EvaluatingdW/dt1 at t2 =0,we
have
=f(QF)[y(q-qe)-t1]—+ F(O')y— (6)




+ f(0R)(qR -q0) (7)
Consider first the case of rational expectations. If the marginal firm is a
fly-by-night, dOR/dt1 =0(from 3a)) and dOF/dt1 >0.Thus, the right-hand
side of (7) is negative for any positive t1. If, instead, the marginal firm is
reputable, so that = thenthe right-hand side of (7) reduces to
_f(OR)[t1 +(q-
qR)}deR/dt1,which again is negative for t1 >0.In either
event, temporary infant-industry protection reduces welfare in a rational
expectations equilibrium.
Although protection promotes further entry, it does not correct the distor-
tions associated with the imperfect consumer information. The rise in the
first—period price caused by the tariff benefits the various domestic firms
equally, and to an extent that is independent of the qualities that they choose.
In particular, the relative incentive that firms have to behave reputably remains
the same.9 This can be seen, for example, from equation (3a), where we find that
9If firms had general cost functions with rising marginal costs, then the
benefit each would enjoy from the tariff would be proportional to its output
level. Since the marginal cost of high-quality goods exceeds that of—12—
a change in the first-period price has no effect on the margin between reputable
and fly-by-night firms.
Entry in itself adds no producer surplus beyond the implicit subsidy in the
tariff, because the marginal firm earns zero profits. This leaves only the
effect of protection on consumer surplus (net of tariff revenue) to be consid-
ered. Consumers with rational expectations pay a price that leaves them
indifferent between importing and buying the average domestic product. Since the
marginal entrant always provides lower quality than does the average domestic
firm, the entrant's product provides negative social surplus. In other words,
while temporary protection does not alleviate the moral hazard problem, it
actually exacerbates the distortion stemming from adverse selection.
10
Next, we consider the case of exogenous expectations, with qe =q.
Surprisingly, the analysis is quite similar. If the marginal firmisa fly—by-
night, then again d0'/dt1 =0,and since we must have q >
q0for entry to occur,
any positive first-period tariff rate yields lower welfare than does free trade.
minimumquality goods at any level of output, it is likely that the firm with
index 0 would produce more as a fly-by-night than it would as a reputable firm.
Against this is the fact that the effective price itRreceives (over the two
periods) for above minimum-quality output, [p ÷ oz(e )]/(1 ÷ ó), might exceed the
priceRit receives for minimum-quality output, p.If indeed the optimal output
for 0 as a fly-by-night were greater than its optimal output as a reputable
fkrm, a tariff would actually lower the incentive for reputable behavior. Then
o would fall, which then is an additional channel through which protection would
reduce domestic welfare.
10If outputs couldvary, as they would if cost functions were instead
Oc(q,x), then there would be a further effect of protection on welfare, in
addition to that already noted in footnote 9. That is, firms with above average
quality might expand their outputs by more or less than those with below average
quality. In this regard, there are offsetting considerations present in our
model. First, the firms producing the highest quality products are also the ones
that are most efficient, so their marginal costs might be expected to rise less
steeply than for the others. But the fly-by-nights might also expand output
relatively greatly, since their quality level is significantly lower. This would
be the case if c were positive. An argument for protection based on output
expansion by exisag firms would require that the former effect dominates the
latter; but we see no reason to believe that this would generally be the case.-13-
The only circumstance under which temporary protection can be beneficial arises
if expectations are very pessimistic, so that entry is quite difficult, and firms
that would otherwise choose to be reputable are excluded from the market. With
the marginal firm being a reputable one, a small first-period tariff raises
welfare if and only if qR >q.Temporaryprotection is warranted only when the
quality of the worst domestic product available on the market exceeds the quality
expected by consumers to be the average among domestic goods. Evidently, our
conclusions about the harmful effects of temporary protection in markets plagued
by moral hazard and adverse selection problems are not very sensitive to the
specification of the way in which consumers form their expectations about product
quality.
C. Permanent Protection
Proponents of the infant-industry argument do not often advocate permanent
protection of the new sectors. It is believed that protection from imports will
no longer be "needed" once the industry reaches its maturity. In our model,
permanent protection suffers the additional disadvantage of being time inconsis-
tent. Once the second period arrives, the government will have no incentive to
continue any protection that it provided in the first period. However, we will
now argue that if the government can somehow commit itself to a policy of perma-
nent protection of the infant industry, such a policy might actually enhance
domestic welfare in situations where temporary protection would do just the
opposite.
The point can be seen most easily by considering the effect of protection
provided only in the second period. Such protection benefits only those firms
that remain active then, namely the firms that choose to be reputable. By
offering a reward that can only be collected by reputable firms, the government-14-
alters the incentives for producing above-minimum quality and thereby partially
alleviates the moral hazard problem.






If the marginal firm is a fly-by-night, then dO'/dt2 =0.But the first term in
(8) is positive for small t2, since dGR/dt2 >0and qR >q0.A second-period
tariff does not affect the total number of firms that initially enters the
market, but more of those that do enter opt to establish reputations for high
quality. Consequently, average quality rises in the first period, yielding
higher social welfare.
The result is different if the marginal firm in the market, absent pro-
tection, is a reputable one. Then dq/dt2 = - q)dGR/dt2<0.Second-period
protection causes more firms to enter, and the new entrants behave reputably.
But these new firms offer lower quality than any of the original participants in
the market, so average quality falls. It follows that second-period protection
is detrimental to domestic welfare in this case.
What then of permanent protection at a constant rate t? Clearly such
protection must be harmful when the marginal firm under free trade has q >q0.
But in the case where the marginal firm is a fly-by-night, the beneficial effect
of second-period protection in correcting the moral hazard problem can outweigh
the deleterious effect of the first-period tariff, which induces more fly-by--15-
night entry. The condition for a small permanent tariff to increase domestic
welfare is
R R F-




This condition is most likely to be satisfied when there are more firms at the
margin of being reputable than there are at the zero-profit margin, and when the
marginal reputable firm provides above-average quality.
III. INFANT-INDUSTRY PROTECTION IN A SIGNALLING EQUILIBRIuM
A. Separating Equilibrium in a Model with Signalling
In the model of the previous section, the more efficient firms were not able
to signal their greater quality incentives to the uninformed consumers. In this
section, we modify the model to allow for potential signalling. When signalling
is successful, consumers can infer qualities from their observation of some other
variables chosen by the firms. In the resulting separating equilibrium, first-
period prices reflect the qualities actually provided. As we shall see, the
effects of tariffs in such circumstances are rather different from those that
obtain when signalling is not possible.
We alter the model in two ways, one substantive and the other merely for
simplification. First, we suppose that firms can select their capacity levels,
x(0), by investing in capital equipment. Capital is assumed to be durable and
can be used to produce output of any quality. Thus, x might reflect the size of
a manufacturing firm's factory or the number of professionals a service provider
maintains on its (quasi-fixed) payroll. A firm of type 0 with installed capacity
x can produce up to x units of a good or service of quality q at constant-16—
variable cost Oc(q). All firms face the same cost of capital, k(x), with k' >
Oand k" >0.
Second, we limit the set of possible quality choices to two: qH and qL,
with qH >qLAs before, we assume that a product with characteristics qL
cannot profitably be sold by even the most efficient firm to consumers who know
or suspect its quality.This means that, in a fully separating equilibrium,
fly-by-night firms do not make any sales.
With these new assumptions, capacity (or output) can serve as a signal of
quality. A firm that plans to be reputable has greater incentive to install
durable capacity, which it can use for two periods, than does a fly-by-night
firm, which must amortize its equipment in a single period. By sinking a large
fixed investment, a potential entrant partially commits itself to remaining
active in the market. Consumers may come to associate high quality with firms
that have made large capital investments, while those with little commitment to
the market will be suspected of being fly-by-nights.




Consumers buy only from firms that they believe will offer high-quality products.
They are willing to pay a first-period price of p =yq11-U+t1
and a
second-period price (as before) of z =yqH-+ t2.Thus, a firm of type 0
that chooses q =qHand x >xcan enjoy profits ltR(e) =(1+ô)[yq11
-U"-
Oc(qH)Jx+(t.+ôt2)x
-k(x).Alternatively, such a firm could choose qL but




The most efficient firms might not be constrained by the need to install
capacity at least equal to x to signal their reputable intentions. Their profits
are maximized at x(O) > x, given by the first-order condition
(l+ó){yq11 -U*-Oc(qH)J+ t1 + ôt =k'(x) . (9)
We let O denote the index of the marginal firm for whom the signalling
constraint is just binding, i.e. ,x(OS)=
Firmswith intermediate efficiency parameters in the range 0(QS0R]
enter the market by installing capacities x(O) =x,which exceed the levels that
they would choose under full information.1' The associated loss of profits is
the cost to them of having to signal their intention to produce quality qH• The
marginal firm earns zero profits, so
-U'-ORc(qH)]+ (t1 + ôt2) -k(x) 0 . (10)
Finally, it must be the case that all those firms that enter the market
actually prefer to provide high quality rather than low quality, and that those
11 . . . . . . Itis interesting to compare this property of our signalling equilibrium
with that which would obtain under an alternative cost and information structure.
Suppose there was no durable capacity to serve as a commitment to the market
(i.e., no sunk costs), but that production in each period required a fixfid cost
and a rising marginal cost, with themarginal cost of goods of quality q
exceeding that of goods of quality q at any given level of output. Suppose
further that word-of-mouth information flows were sufficient to allow reputable
firms to expand their sales to the extent they would wish to do so, once their
reputations had been established. Then absent signalling considerations,
fly-by-night firms would generally choose output levels greater than those
selected by reputable firms, and the latter could signal quality by remaining
smaller in the first period than would otherwise be optimal. It seems consistent
with casual empirical observation that large firms are believed to be reputable
in industries with large sunk costs (e.g., soft drinks, laundry detergents),
since these firms have much to lose from running down their reputations.-18-
that do not enter could not make positive profits at either quality level. We
note that d[T(O)-7t'(O)]/d0 <0,so that if the marginal firm has 7TR(OR) >
ltF(o)so too will those that are more efficient. Also, dTtR(0)/dO <0and
dltF(O)/dO<0,so that those potential entrants that are less efficient than the
firm of type cannot earn positive profits.
We obtain our final equilibrium condition by placing a restriction on
out-of-equilibrium beliefs. If, in a candidate equilibrium, 1(R(QR) were
FR . SR
strictly greater than it(0),thenany firmwith0[0,0 Icouldreduce its
capacity investment slightly by £,andclaim that only a reputable firm would
have an incentive to install capacity x -c.The deviant firm would be correct
in its claim, and, if believed, the deviation would be profitable. We choose to
restrict the class of signalling equilibria to those in which no reputable firm
can credibly separate itself from the fly-by-nights at some alternative and more
• 12 • • .. . profitablelevel of output. With this further restriction, the equilibrium
must have itR(OR) =itF(oR)After some rearrangement, this condition reduces to
o(yqH -U+t2)
=OR[(l+o)c(qH)-c(qL)] (11)
Equations (9), (10) and (11) determine a function x(O), and values for
and x that satisfy all the conditions for a separating equilibrium. If the
solution to these equations has x(Omin) >x,then these values comprise the
unique equilibrium satisfying our constraint on out-of-equilibrium beliefs. In
particular, no pooling equilibrium can exist under these circumstances. If,
"Smallness" often is associated with high quality where sunk costs are not
important, such as in many service activities.
effect, we are arguing that the most plausible among all the
separating, rational expectations equilibria is that which has the smallest
signalling requirement, x.-19-
alternatively, x(O) < x, then there might also exist a pooling equilibrium,
with some fly-by-night firms entering the market, all active firms producing the
same output, and consumers rationally expecting a level of quality equal to the
average among domestic firms. Since the pooling equilibrium that might arise in
this case is qualitatively the same as that analyzed in Section II, we will
concentrate here on the separating equilibrium that obtains when (10), (11), and
possibly (9) apply.
B. Temporary and Permanent Tariffs
As before, we take social welfare to be the sum of consumer surplus,





PS=f{(l+ô)[yq1-U"- Oc(q11)]x(O) + (t1+ôt2)x(O) -k(x(O))}dF(O)
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Consider first temporary protection, with dc=
dt1and t2=0.From (11)
we see that dOR/dt1 =0.Then (10) implies dx/dt1 =2/[k'()-k(x)]>0.
With infant-industry protection, firms must install more capacity to signal their
intention to choose qH The extra cost of doing so dissipates the subsidy
implicit in the tariff. In the new equilibrium, the same number of firms enter,
but all firms operate at greater scale.
What then are the welfare implications of first-period protection? The
first term in (12) is zero at free trade, but negative for any positive t1. This
term represents the distortion associated with any excess output by the most
efficient firms. The second term reflects the welfare cost of any output expan-
sion by the firms that must inflate their capital investments to signal quality.
The term in the second integral is negative for any t1 >0,since for these
firms >x(O)implies (16)[yqH -U"-Oc(q1)]
-k'G)<-(t1
+ot2).But we
have noted already that dx/dt1 >0.Protection raises the cost of signalling,
thereby exacerbating the social loss from the imperfect consumer information. It
follows that temporary protection necessarily reduces welfare in a separating
equilibrium.
13
13Referring to our discussion in footnote 11, protection would also lower
welfare in situations where low levels of output were used to signal quality.
Then an increase in t would require reputable firms to further cut their outputs
below the first-best level in order to signal their reputable intentions. We-21-
We model permanent protection by setting t1t2 =tand dc =dt.
Differentiating (11), we find immediately that dOR/dt =o/{(l+o)c(qH)_c(qL)j>
0. Permanent protection improves the profit opportunities in the market, thereby
causing more firms to enter. Next we differentiate (10), and substitute for
dOR/dt, which gives
2
dx —,(l+O)[c(gH)-c(g1)Jc ____________ dtt H L -
(1+ô)c(q) -c(q) xk (x) -k(x)
Evidently, an increase in the rate of permanent protection increases the critical
level of capacity that signals reputable intentions.
The welfare effects of an increase in permanent protection are derived using
(12). Away from free trade, both the expansion in the output of the most effi-
cient firms and the entry into the market of additional (reputable) firms imply a
loss of social welfare. Both sorts of extra output require resources whose
opportunity cost exceeds their marginal social product in the infant industry.
And, like first-period protection, a permanent tariff augments the social cost of
signalling. We conclude therefore, in contrast with our findings for the no-
signalling case, that permanent protection always reduces welfare in a
separating equilibrium.
In a signalling equilibrium, the less efficient, low-quality producers
impose an externality on those that seek to distinguish themselves as having the
incentive to offer high quality. This externality arises from the mere potential
presence of the former group in the market. The externality implies an excess
burden for those that signal, since a signal can only be effective if it is
conclude that irrespective of the direction that the signalling requirement
pushes reputable firms, because a tariff makes entry by fly-by-nights easier
ceterus paribus, it raises the social cost of the signals.-22-
costly.Protection of any kind (and indeed any output subsidy) increases the
profitability of the less efficient producers and makes them more of a threat to
enter the market. It thereby raises the cost to the efficient producers of
separating themselves out. Thus, entry-promoting protection is bound to be
harmful in a signalling equilibrium.
IV.CONCLUSION
We have investigated the case for infant-industry tariff protection in
situations where information serves as a barrier to entry. Our starting point
has been a model in which a well-established foreign sector competes in the
domestic market for an experience good or service with a cost-efficient but
initially unknown set of potential domestic entrants. In the infancy of the
domestic industry, consumers must form expectations about the attributes of
domestic products, recognizing both the moral hazard in an individual seller's
choice of quality and the adverse selection that arises when various potential
entrants have access to different technologies of production. Thus, domestic
firms suffer a temporary competitive disadvantage owing to their lack of
reputations.
We found that temporary tariff protection to promote entry generally lowers
domestic welfare. When domestic firms are unable to signal their qualities, a
temporary tariff does not alter the incentive each firmhasto provide high-
quality products, but the marginal entry induced by such a tariff generally
reduces consumer surplus (and must do so if consumers have rational expecta-
tions). In other words, infant-industry protection does not alleviate the moral
hazard problem in such cases, and actually exacerbates that caused by adverse
selection. When domestic firms are in fact able to signal their reputable-23-
intentions via their choice of a high level of capital investment, a temporary
tariff increases the social cost of signalling.
Our results concerning permanent protection were mixed. We noted first that
a policy of permanent protection generally is time inconsistent; that is, once
the mature phase of industry competition arrives, the government has an incentive
to terminate any protection from the infancy phase. However, if the government
can somehow commit itself to continue protection, then there might be benefit
from a permanent tariff, depending upon industry circumstances. For example,
when firms cannot signal quality and when the marginal entrant produces minimum
quality, a permanent tariff might raise domestic welfare, because the second-
period tariff rewards only those firms that behave reputably in the first period.
We found, however, that if quality signalling is possible, a permanent tariff
like a temporary tariff is harmful, because it increases the level of excess
capacity investment needed to signal high quality.
Our negative findings about the efficacy of protection do not imply that the
market works well in the situations that we have described, or that other forms
of government intervention would not be desirable. Rather, we have shown that
trade policy (or output subsidies more generally) do not correct the distortions
that arise when consumers are imperfectly informed. A temporary output subsidy
rewards reputable firms and fly-by-nights equally, and does not alter the incen-
tives that firms face in choosing among these strategies. Furthermore, even when
information is a barrier to entry, the marginal firms that enter in response to
an output subsidy may well lower the average quality of domestic products avail-
able on the market. These considerations suggest that appropriate policy should
seek to reward firms that invest in their reputations, without encouraging entry
or expansion by others. We leave to future research the task of identifying such
policies.-24-
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